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UTILIZING THE FOURTH OPTION: EXAMINING THE
PERMISSIBILITY OF STRUCTURED DISMISSALS THAT DO
NOT DEVIATE FROM THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S
PRIORITY SCHEME
ABSTRACT
Following a § 363 asset sale, the Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with
three options to close its chapter 11 case: (1) request confirmation of a
liquidation plan; (2) convert the chapter 11 case to a chapter 7 case; or (3)
request dismissal of the case. There is a fourth option, however: a structured
dismissal. Structured dismissals are controversial because the Code does not
expressly provide for them. Opponents thus equate structured dismissals with
impermissible sub rosa plans. Existing caselaw does not provide a clear
answer as to whether courts have the discretionary authority, under the Code,
to authorize structured dismissals. In 2015, the Third Circuit was the first
Court of Appeals to grant a structured dismissal settlement. In approving the
structured dismissal, the court also held that, in rare instances, a structured
dismissal can deviate from the priority scheme in § 507. Through the
structured dismissal, the Third Circuit engineered a mechanism for parties to
evade the mandatory priority scheme.
This Comment argues that while the Third Circuit had the statutory
authority to grant a structured dismissal, the court did not have the authority,
statutory or otherwise, to approve a dismissal that deviated from § 507. This
Comment takes the position that the Code’s priority scheme applies to all
estate distributions in a chapter 11 proceeding, including a structured
dismissal.

WEBB GALLEYSPROOFS2

356

7/12/2017 2:57 PM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 33

INTRODUCTION
Like most legal proceedings, a number of administrative fees encumber
bankruptcy filings.1 To circumvent costly proceedings that do not maximize
the value of a bankruptcy estate, select bankruptcy courts have approved
structured dismissals in chapter 11 cases.2 A structured dismissal is a cross
between a dismissal and a confirmation order, which dismisses a chapter 11
case with additional pre-determined provisions.3 Structured dismissals are
typically consensual agreements between the debtor and some, if not all, of the
creditors.4
In a standard chapter 11 proceeding, the parties first propose a plan of
reorganization.5 The plan must meet certain requirements under § 1129 of the
Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”).6 If the plan satisfies § 1129, the bankruptcy
court will approve the plan.7 When the plan is substantially fulfilled, the court
closes the case with no additional strings attached.8 This dismissal returns the
debtor to its pre-bankruptcy status.9

1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (2012). Specifically under § 1930(a)(3), “[t]he parties commencing a case under
title 11 shall pay to the clerk of the district court or the clerk of the bankruptcy court, if one has been certified
pursuant to section 156(b) of this title, the following filing fees: . . . (3) For a case commenced under chapter
11 of title 11 . . . $1,167.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, BANKRUPTCY BASICS (2011), http://www.
uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics (“The courts are
required to charge a $1,167 case filing fee and a $550 miscellaneous administrative fee.”).
2 See, e.g., In re Felda Plantation, LLC, No. 9:11-bk-14614-BSS., 2012 WL 1071671 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
Mar. 26, 2012) (granting a structured dismissal because of consensual agreement between debtor and
creditors); see also Norman L. Pernick & G. David Dean, Structured Chapter 11 Dismissals: A Viable and
Growing Alternative After Asset Sales, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1 (June 2010) http://www.coleschotz.com/
2B7963/assets/files/News/293.pdf (noting that, as late as 2010, “cases involving structured dismissals ha[d]
not yet resulted in memorandum decisions (published or unpublished), [but] there ha[d] been a number of
rulings that are useful to understanding how structured dismissals have been . . . viewed by courts”).
3 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 270 (2014).
4 See In re Felda Plantation, 2012 WL 1071671 (granting a structured dismissal because of a consensual
agreement between debtor and creditors). All parties were placed on notice of the structured dismissal motion
and no one objected. Id.; see also Charles M. Ollerman & Mark G. Douglas, Taking a Stand Where Few Have
Trodden: Structured Dismissal Held Clearly Authorized by the Bankruptcy Code, JONES DAY, Sept./Oct. 2014,
http://www.jonesday.com/taking-a-stand-where-few-have-trodden-structured-dismissal-held-clearlyauthorized-by-the-bankruptcy-code-10-01-2014/.
5 Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4.
6 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012). The court will only confirm a consensual plan that meets all of the
requirements prescribed in part (a) of § 1129. Id. § 1129(a).
7 Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4.
8 Id.
9 11 U.S.C. § 349.
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Pre-negotiated asset sales under § 363 serve as an alternative to the
standard chapter 11 process.10 A § 363 sale allows a debtor to liquidate most, if
not all, of its assets free of existing liens and interests.11 Following a § 363 sale,
a debtor has a handful of options to finalize its chapter 11 case.12 Debtors most
commonly utilize one of the following three options: (1) request confirmation
of a liquidation plan; (2) convert the chapter 11 case to a chapter 7 case; or (3)
request a dismissal of the case.13
More recently, courts have allowed debtors and creditors to utilize
structured dismissals as a fourth option.14 Structured dismissals are particularly
appealing to debtors that have disposed of assets through a sale because the
dismissals are less costly and typically more expeditious than proposing and
confirming a reorganization plan.15 Structured dismissals are controversial,
however, because they are not expressly provided for under the Code.16
Two notable opponents of structured dismissal are the United States
Trustee (“UST”) and the American Bankruptcy Institute.17 In the wake of the
growing popularity of structured dismissals, the UST co-authored and
published an article that delineated several objections to such dismissals.18 The
UST primarily argued that structured dismissals fail to afford parties with the
protections provided in a standard confirmation process and therefore “strongly
resemble impermissible sub rosa plans.”19 Additionally, the American

A dismissal of a case – (2) vacates any order, judgment, or transfer ordered, under
section 522(i)(1), 542, 550, or 553 of this title; and (3) revests the property of the estate in the
entity in which such property was vested immediately before the commencement of the case
under this title.
10

Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4.
Douglas E. Deutsch & Michael G. Distefano, The Mechanics of a § 363 Sale, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1
(Feb.
2011),
http://www.chadbourne.com/files/Publication/4dbdca20-38ed-4d4c-bc04-a637b7a6997d/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/962b73fc-20b1-4652-88a3-a8b84134f4b8/blocks%202-11.pdf.
12 Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4.
13 Id.; Pernick & Dean, supra note 2.
14 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2.
15 In re Petersburg Regency LLC, 540 B.R. 508, 532 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015) (noting that granting the
structured dismissal would prevent more “expensive litigation . . . .”).
16 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 270.
17 Amir Shachmurove, Another Way Out: Structured Dismissals in Jevic’s Wake, NORTON BANKR. L.
ADVISER 1 (Thomson Reuters, Saint Paul, Minn.), Nov. 2015, Westlaw, 2015 No. 11 Norton Bankr. L.
Adviser NL 1.
18 Lisa L. Lambert, Nan Roberts Eitel & T. Patrick Tinker, Structured Dismissals, or Cases Dismissed
Outside of Code’s Structure?, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20 (Mar. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
ust/legacy/2011/07/13/abi_201103.pdf; Shachmurove, supra note 17.
19 Lambert, Eitel & Tinker, supra note 18, at 20.
11
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Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 released
a lengthy report suggesting that Congress amend the Code to clarify that
structured dismissals are impermissible.20
In 2015, the Third Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to approve
structured dismissals in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT
Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.).21 Prior to the appeal, a
New Jersey trucking company filed for bankruptcy.22 Following the debtor’s
§ 363 sale, the trucking company and select creditors agreed upon a settlement
that dictated how they would disperse the remaining assets of the company.23
The bankruptcy court approved the settlement and dismissed the case, even
though the agreement intentionally left out a class of priority claimants.24 The
neglected claimants appealed.25
Two issues were presented on appeal in In re Jevic.26 First, does a chapter
11 case dismissal always amount to a “hard reset”?27 In other words, does a
dismissal always return the debtor to its prebankruptcy status, or does the court
have discretion to issue any additional requirements or provisions attached to a
chapter 11 case dismissal?28 In approving structured dismissals, the court
reasoned that a dismissal does not have to amount to a hard reset.29
Second, is it permissible for a structured dismissal settlement to deviate
from the Code’s priority scheme under § 507?30 The court held that structured
dismissals may deviate, but only in rare instances.31
20 COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 3, at 272–73; see also Shachmurove,
supra note 17.
21 787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015).
22 Id. at 176.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 179.
26 Id. at 175.
27 Id. at 181.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 175.
31 Id. The “rare instances” the Third Circuit noted will depend on the facts of each case. In In re Jevic,
for example, the court found that the structured dismissal was the “least bad alternative” because there was “no
prospect” of a plan being confirmed and conversion to chapter 7 would have resulted in the secured creditors
taking their collateral “in short order.” Id. at 185. In In re Petersburg Regency LLC, the Bankruptcy Court for
the District of New Jersey found “the instant case is stronger than Jevic because all creditors, except the
Harmons, are receiving a distribution and the ‘class-skipping’ issue which figured in Jevic is not present here.”
540 B.R. 508, 532 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2015). The court also noted four other factors that constituted the requisite
“rare instances”: (1) no classes are being skipped; (2) dismissing the case now would prevent “many more
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Keeping in mind that one of the Code’s core goals is to maximize the value
of an estate, bankruptcy parties must seek creative options to resolve chapter
11 cases.32 This Comment proceeds in two parts and examines the
permissibility and necessity of structured dismissals that do not deviate from
the Code’s priority scheme. First, this Comment defends the proposition that
structured dismissals are permissible under the Code. Second, this Comment
addresses the current split between the Third and Fifth Circuits regarding the
applicability of §§ 507 and 1129 of the Code to settlement agreements.33 After
careful analysis, this Comment contends that §§ 507 and 1129 apply to
settlement agreements in the context of structured dismissals.
I. FRAMEWORK
This section of the Comment provides an overview of the seminal In re
Jevic case and structured dismissals in four parts. First, it recounts the facts and
Third Circuit’s holding in In re Jevic. Next, it describes what structured
dismissals are and how they work by outlining the types of remedies that
derive from structured dismissals. Then, this section explains the three
standard options to finalize a chapter 11 case provided by the Code. Finally,
this section concludes by explaining the Code’s priority scheme.
A. Highlighting the Case: In re Jevic Holding Corp.
In 2006, Sun Capital Partners acquired Jevic Transportation, Inc., a New
Jersey trucking company, in a leveraged buyout.34 A group of lenders, led by
CIT Group, funded the acquisition.35 CIT gave Jevic an $85 million line of

months or years of continuing and expensive litigation . . .;” (3) the secured claims “far exceeded” the value of
the collateral; and (4) no realistic possibility of a reorganization or conversion to chapter 7 existed. Id.
32 See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991); In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 186.
33 Compare In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 186 (permitting a structured dismissal that deviated from the Code’s
priority scheme), with In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984) (determining the settlement was
not “fair and equitable” for two reasons: (1) it placed a junior creditor's interest before that of the government’s
senior interest; and (2) the approval was not “informed” because the value of the estate was based on “guesses
and conjecture”), and Motorola, Inc. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Iridium Operating LLC),
478 F.3d 452, 466–67 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding the settlement agreement was not an impermissible sub rosa
plan of reorganization because the agreement was in the best interest of the estate).
34 In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 175. “A leveraged buyout (LBO) is the acquisition of another company using a
significant amount of borrowed money (bonds or loans) to meet the cost of acquisition. The assets of the
company being acquired are often used as collateral for the loans, along with the assets of the acquiring
company.”
Leveraged
Buyout–LBO,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/
leveragedbuyout.asp (last visited March 11, 2016).
35 In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 175.
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credit, conditioned upon Jevic maintaining at least $5 million in assets and
collateral.36 In the following years, Jevic’s business continued to plummet; by
May 2008, Jevic’s board of directors agreed to file for chapter 11.37 Jevic
ceased operations and notified its employees of their immediate termination.38
At the time of filing, Jevic owed over $73 million to both its first priority
secured creditors (CIT and Sun Capital) and its general unsecured creditors.39
An official committee was developed to represent the unsecured creditors.40
The committee sued the secured creditors for fraudulent conveyance, claiming
that Sun Capital, with funds from CIT, acquired Jevic with improper
projections of profitability.41 Additionally, a group of terminated Jevic
employees filed a class action suit against the secured creditors and Jevic
because Jevic did not provide its employees with the requisite sixty-day notice
of termination prior to layoffs, as required by the New Jersey Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN Act”).42
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware partially
granted and partially denied Jevic’s motion to dismiss the fraudulent transfer
suit. The court held that the secured creditors’ acquisition of Jevic constituted
both a fraudulent transfer and preferential transfer under §§ 547 and 548;43
however, the secured creditors’ actions did not constitute a fraudulent transfer
under § 544.44 The ex-employees obtained a similar mixed result in their
WARN Act suit.45 The court entered a ruling against Jevic because it
determined that Jevic fell within the WARN Act’s definition of “employer.”46
The court granted the secured creditors’ summary judgment motion, however,
because it determined that the secured creditors did not fall within this same
definition.47
Following the court’s ruling, the committee, secured creditors, terminated
employees, and Jevic’s board of directors met to negotiate a settlement for the
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id.
Id.
Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 176.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fraudulent conveyance suit.48 The committee concluded that a settlement was a
more desirable solution in light of Jevic’s limited remaining assets ($1.7
million in cash).49 In the interim between the original bankruptcy filing date
and the settlement agreement meeting, Jevic liquidated its assets.50 The final
terms of the settlement agreement allocated Jevic’s remaining $1.7 million to
taxes, administrative creditors, and unsecured creditors.51 Specifically, the
settlement accomplished four things:
(1) The involved parties would exchange releases of their claims
against each other, and the fraudulent conveyance action would be
dismissed with prejudice;
(2) CIT would pay $2 million into an account earmarked to pay
Jevic’s and the committee’s legal fees and other administrative
expenses;
(3) Sun Capital would assign its lien on Jevic’s remaining $1.7
million to a trust, which would pay tax and administrative creditors
first and then the general unsecured creditors on a pro rata basis; and
(4) Jevic’s chapter 11 case would be dismissed.52

Notably, the agreement did not provide for any distribution to the drivers
(Jevic’s ex-employees), even though they had an uncontested WARN Act
claim.53 The drivers argued that a portion of the claim was a priority wage
claim under § 507(a)(4), and their claim was entitled to a higher priority than
the tax and unsecured creditors’ claims.54
The ex-employees rejected the settlement because creditors of a lower
priority received the remaining Jevic assets.55 The court ignored the
employees’ objection and approved the settlement agreement.56 The court
dismissed the case as a structured dismissal, conditioned on the parties’
execution of the terms of the settlement agreement.57

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 177.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 178.
Id.
Id.
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B. How Structured Dismissals Work
Generally, before a party may file a motion for a structured dismissal to
conclude its bankruptcy case, a § 363 sale occurs.58 Section 363 sales are
increasingly used by debtors that wish to sell substantially all of their assets
instead of attempting to restructure through the chapter 11 process.59 Under
§ 363, the debtor or a court appointed trustee may sell any asset in which the
debtor has a legal or equitable ownership interest at the beginning of the
bankruptcy case.60 Anyone except the trustee or an officer of the court may
purchase assets from the sale.61
There are two types of § 363 sales: those made (1) in the ordinary course of
business; or (2) outside the ordinary course of business.62 Allowing the sale of
property conducted in the ordinary course of business enables the debtor to
continue operations while in bankruptcy as long as the court approves the
sale.63 In contrast, the sale of property conducted outside the ordinary course of
business requires notice and hearing.64 Notice and hearing is a prerequisite to
the sale’s approval because it provides creditors the opportunity to object.65 If
there are no timely objections, the § 363 sale may proceed.66 If there are
objections to the sale, the court will conduct a hearing and determine whether
the sale is appropriate.67
Debtors generally utilize structured dismissals if one of three scenarios
occurs following a § 363 asset sale: (1) the debtor is unable to pay
administrative debts or fund a chapter 11 plan; (2) the debtor has sufficient
funds from the asset sale to fund a chapter 11 plan, but doing so would
significantly drain the available funds for creditor distribution; or (3) the debtor
has remaining assets after a § 363 sale and creditors agree to negotiate an out-

58 John Kane, Structured Dismissals – How They Work Part I: Court Authority for Alternative Ending,
INSOLVENCY INSIGHTS BLOG (Sept. 22. 2014), http://insolvencyinsights.com/2014/09/22/structured-dismissalshow-they-work-part-i-court-authority-for-an-alternative-ending/.
59 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2.
60 Philip A. Schovanec, Comment, The Sale of Property Under Section 363: The Validity of Sales
Conducted Without Proper Notice, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 489, 495 (1993).
61 Id. at 494.
62 Id. at 496.
63 Id. at 496–97.
64 Id. at 496.
65 Id. at 498.
66 Id. at 499.
67 Id.
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of-court agreement to administer the remaining assets.68 The purpose of each
scenario is to demonstrate that there are insufficient post-363 sale assets to
make necessary payment distributions to creditors and fulfill a chapter 11
reorganization plan.69
For the court to grant a structured dismissal, the movant must demonstrate
a cause for dismissal.70 The three aforementioned scenarios are sufficient
reasons to establish cause.71 A structured dismissal goes beyond a standard
chapter 11 dismissal.72 While a standard chapter 11 dismissal will simply end
all court proceedings,73 a structured dismissal will end all court proceedings
and contain varying “bells and whistles,” such as the orders, settlements, and
provisions that continue to govern the dismissal.74
1. Structured Dismissal Remedies
The facts and desired outcome of a case will determine what bells and
whistles are included in a structured dismissal. As previously discussed, a
structured dismissal does not simply dismiss a bankruptcy case. Instead, courts
utilizing structured dismissals will dismiss cases and mandate additional
requirements for the parties to fulfill—i.e., bells and whistles. Typically, bells
and whistles fall into at least one of four categories: (1) release and exculpation
provisions; (2) claims reconciliation processes and distribution procedures; (3)
carve-outs and “gift” trusts; and (4) enforceability of prior orders and retention
of jurisdiction.75

68 Peter M. Sweeney, Delaware Views from the Bench–Structured Dismissals, 4 BLAKELY & BLAKELY
Q. (Winter 2014), http://www.bandblaw.com/newsletter/archived/2014WinterBBQuarterly.pdf; see also JAY
R. INDYKE, ET AL., STRAFFORD, CHAPTER 11 STRUCTURED DISMISSALS: VIABLE EXIT STRATEGY OR
IMPERMISSIBLE UNDER BANKRUPTCY CODE? (2014), http://media.straffordpub.com/products/chapter-11structured-dismissals-viable-exit-strategy-or-impermissible-under-bankruptcy-code-2014-1028/presentation.pdf.
69 JAY R. INDYKE, ET AL., supra note 68.
70 Kane, supra note 58.
71 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 2.
72 Kane, supra note 58.
73 U.S. BANKR. COURT CENT. DIST. OF CAL., Dismissal, Conversion & Closing of A Bankruptcy Case,
What are the Differences Between Them?, http://www.cacb.uscourts.gov/faq/dismissal-conversion-closingbankruptcy-case-what-are-differences-between-them (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
74 Kane, supra note 58; Sweeney, supra note 68.
75 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 2.
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a. Release and Exculpation Provisions
The first category of relief that courts provide through structured dismissals
eliminates the debtor’s risk of potential future obligations by adding either
release provisions or exculpatory provisions to the final court order.76 Both
provisions relieve parties from liability on a claim.77 These provisions are
either specific to one or more certain, identified claims or apply more broadly
to cover potential claims.78
Release provisions discharge a party within a suit from another related or
non-related pending course of action.79 They are commonly found in settlement
agreements where parties mutually agree to settle one claim in exchange for a
release from another pending suit.80 The following boilerplate release provision
of a settlement agreement illustrates how comprehensive these provisions can
be:
Each Party hereby fully, finally, and forever releases and discharges
the other Party, and any and all of its respective past, present, and
future affiliates from any and all actions, causes of action, claims,
demands, damages, debts, losses, costs, expenses, attorney fees or
other liabilities of every kind and nature whatsoever; whether legal or
equitable and whether known or unknown, arising out of, resulting
from, or relating to, in any manner, the Action, the claims and causes
of action that were or could have been asserted relating to the Action,
or any facts or circumstances related to the Action.81

Exculpatory provisions prevent a party from pursuing a legal claim against
another party that it otherwise could assert.82 Though parties are generally free
to devise their own terms of a release or exculpatory provision, parties cannot

76 In re Naartjie Custom Kids, Inc., 534 B.R. 416, 419 (Bankr. D. Utah 2015) (“The Settlement
Agreement also provided that customary release and exculpation provisions will be included in the order
resolving the case.”).
77 See, e.g., In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 266 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) (outlining the provisions of the
structured dismissal, which included releasing the trustee from any liability connected to the chapter 11 case);
In re Strategic Labor, Inc., 467 B.R. 11, 17 n.10 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (listing provisions commonly found
in structured dismissal agreements and the controversy associated with them).
78 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 3.
79 See In re Biolitec, 528 B.R. at 266.
80 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Settlement Agreement Between FDIC and PCMG, April 2011,
https://www.fdic.gov/about/freedom/plsa/oh_amtrust_bank_cleveland_1.pdf.
81 Id.
82 See In re Century Elecs. Mfg., Inc., 345 B.R. 33, 34 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006); Neal J Suit,
Understanding the Differences Between Indemnity and Exculpatory Clauses, CAPITAL (2013), http://www.
ccsb.com/pdf/Publications/RealEstate/Differences_Between_Indemnity_and_Exculpatory_Clauses.pdf.
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create provisions that will limit their liability in a manner that violates the law
or is against public policy.83
b. Reconciliation Process
In a structured dismissal order that contains reconciliation provisions, a
party’s objective is to reconcile claims in a speedy and cost-effective fashion.84
The reconciliation orders will often contain provisions similar to those found in
chapter 11 confirmation plans.85 The reconciliation process requires the debtor
to compare creditors’ claims with its own records to confirm or reject
inconsistencies between claims filed by creditors and the debtor’s schedule of
liabilities.86 This process is necessary because some creditors will file invalid
or inflated claims.87
After a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the debtor is required to submit a
schedule of assets and liabilities.88 The schedule outlines the debtor’s current
assets and debts owed to creditors. If the debtor did not list an obligation owed
to a creditor, that creditor must file a proof of claim to participate in a
distribution.89 Although the Code is silent about the time period within which a
party should file its proof of claim, a court will typically set a filing deadline,
known as the “bar date.”90

83 See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 90 (1955). The California Supreme Court devised
an effective six criteria test to determine when contractual agreements affect public policy. Tunkl v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 102 (1963).
84 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 3.
85 Id.
86 See Reconciliation, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 26. 2016), http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/
reconciliation.asp?optm=sa_v2.
87 Carriane J. M. Balser & Heather L. Hyde, Effective Claims Management in Bankruptcy–Planning
Teamwork and Documentation, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jul./Aug. 1998, http://www.abi.org/abi-journal/effectiveclaims-management-in-bankruptcy-planning-teamwork-and-documentation.
88 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 1.
89 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012). Filing a proof of claim is permissive, but a creditor cannot participate in a
distribution if it does not have a claim. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a), (c). Furthermore, certain claims are
excepted from the claim filing requirement. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 501.01[3] (Alan N. Resnick &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
90 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure control the timely filing of proofs of claims. See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 3003(a). Subsection (c)(3) gives the bankruptcy court the authority to set the “bar date,” which
courts strictly enforce. See id. 3003(c)(3); In re Analytical Sys., Inc., 933 F.2d 939, 942 n.5 (11th Cir. 1991).
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c. Gifting
Creditor classes utilize gifting as a mechanism to obtain consensual
structured dismissals.91 Gifting is best illustrated by the First Circuit’s decision
in In re SPM Manufacturing Corp.92 In that case, the debtor sold all of its
assets in a § 363 sale because a chapter 11 reorganization was not feasible.93
The secured creditor maintained a lien on substantially all of the debtor’s
assets.94 Under the Code’s priority scheme, the secured creditor would receive
all of the proceeds from the asset sale, leaving the unsecured creditors empty
handed.95
In an out-of-court negotiation, the secured creditor and the unsecured
creditors’ committee agreed to cooperate in both crafting a reorganization plan
and the remaining bankruptcy proceedings in exchange for a portion of the
secured creditor’s proceeds.96 The agreement was beneficial to the secured
creditor who wanted to end the costly and time-consuming bankruptcy
proceedings without interference from the unsecured creditors.97 The debtor
objected to the secured creditor’s motion seeking approval to distribute a
portion of the sale proceeds to the unsecured creditors.98 The debtor argued that
the proposed distribution improperly paid unsecured creditors before
administrative creditors with a higher priority under § 507.99 The court
reasoned that the secured creditor was guaranteed all available proceeds from
the sale.100 No chance existed that the unsecured creditors or other
administrative creditors would receive any distribution from the sale.101
Therefore, the court concluded that creditors were free to distribute their
bankruptcy dividends however they chose.102
In In re SPM Manufacturing, the creditor was free to distribute a portion of
its proceeds in consideration for the unsecured creditors’ cooperation because

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 1.
984 F.2d 1305 (1st Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1307.
Id.
Id. at 1308.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1309.
Id.
Id. at 1308.
Id.
Id. at 1313.
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the proceeds belonged exclusively to the secured creditor.103 In the context of
structured dismissals, a secured creditor may include gifting provisions in the
dismissal agreement to induce other parties to consent to the dismissal.104
d. Enforceability of Prior Orders and Retention of Jurisdiction
The fourth type of relief in structured dismissal orders is retention orders.
Notwithstanding § 349, bankruptcy courts will retain jurisdiction over matters
even after they dismiss a case.105 Retention provisions are useful in structured
dismissals because they authorize a specific court to implement the dismissal
order, resolve any subsequent matters, or both.106 If the court adds a retention
order, the court will retain jurisdiction over the matter even after it has
dismissed the case. Without retention provisions, the previous orders and
judgments in the bankruptcy case are vacated under § 349.107
C. Exit Strategies
The Code expressly provides three options for a debtor to exit a chapter 11
case: (1) confirming a reorganization plan; (2) converting the case from
chapter 11 to chapter 7; or (3) dismissing the case with no additional bells and
whistles. Each option is briefly discussed in the following subsections.
1. Confirmation of a Reorganization Plan
A debtor’s chapter 11 plan details its reorganization strategy so it can keep
its business alive and repay creditors.108 Businesses can utilize one of two types
of reorganization strategies: (1) reduce payments to creditors while extending
the payment time frame and laying off employees; or (2) cancel existing
purchase orders.109 A court is likely to confirm a chapter 11 plan that is feasible
103

Id.
Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 58.
105 Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4.
106 Id.
107 BLOOMBERG LAW: BANKRUPTCY TREATISE, pt. 1, ch. 41, at 7 (D. Michael Lynn et al. eds., 2016),
www.bloomberglaw.com/content/bankruptcytreatise; see 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(2) (2012) (“Unless the court, for
cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of a case other than under section 742 of this title—(2) vacates any order,
judgment, or transfer ordered, under sections 522(i)(1), 542, 550, or 553 of this title.”).
108 United States Courts, Chapter 11-Bankruptcy Basics, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basic (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
109 How Cases Move Through Federal Courts, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/
autoframe?openagent&nav=menu4c&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/263?opendocument (last visited Aug. 28,
2016).
104
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and in the best interests of the debtor’s creditors.110 Any proposed chapter 11
plan must comply with §§ 1123 and 1129 of the Code, among others.111
Requirements for the content of a chapter 11 plan are enumerated in
§ 1123.112 The plan provisions in subsection (a) are mandatory, whereas the
provisions in subsection (b) are discretionary.113 Under subsection (a), the plan
must specify the classes of claims (i.e., secured or unsecured), detail the
treatment for each class, and provide plausible means to implement the plan.114
The Code’s plan confirmation requirements are enumerated in § 1129.115
Subsections (a)(1) through (6) and (a)(11) through (13) pertain to the plan
itself and stipulate the necessary elements required to confirm a plan.116 For
example, (a)(3) requires the plan be proposed in good faith.117 The remaining
sections pertain to the treatment of classes of claim or interest holders.118
With respect to structured dismissals, the most significant requirement is
§ 1129(a)(8).119 Under this provision, each class of claims or interests must
vote to accept the proposed reorganization plan.120 A collectively accepted plan
is called a consensual plan.121
If all the requirements in § 1129(a), except (a)(8), are met, the court may
still confirm the plan so long as it is fair and equitable.122 This type of plan is a
nonconsensual plan.123 The Supreme Court held, “[t]he words ‘fair and
equitable’ are terms of art—they mean that ‘senior interests are entitled to full
priority over junior ones.’”124 “[N]o class may participate in distribution under

110

See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), (11); see also Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 58.
Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 58.
112 11 U.S.C. § 1123.
113 BLOOMBERG LAW: BANKRUPTCY TREATISE, supra note 107, pt. V, ch. 172.
114 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1), (3), (5).
115 Id. § 1129.
116 John D. Ayer, Michael L. Bernstein & Jonathan Friedland, Chapter 11-“101”: Confirming a Plan,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec.-Jan 2005, at 16.
117 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
118 Ayer, Bernstein & Friedland, supra note 116, at 16.
119 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8).
120 See id. § 1129(a)(7).
121 In re United Marine, 197 B.R. 942, 948 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996).
122 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).
123 In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 266 B.R. 591, 599 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).
124 In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984) (first citing SEC v. Am. Trailer Rentals Co.,
379 U.S. 594, 612 (1965); then citing Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry v.
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 441 (1968)).
111
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the plan unless classes having priority are compensated in full.”125 This concept
is commonly referred to as the absolute priority rule.126 Essentially, the
absolute priority rule reinforces the policies underlying the bankruptcy priority
scheme codified in § 507.127
2. Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 Conversion
The goal of chapter 11 is reorganization, whereas, the goal of chapter 7 is
liquidation and the fair treatment of creditors.128 Under § 1112, a debtor may
convert a chapter 11 case unless one of three scenarios exists: “(1) the debtor is
not a debtor in possession; (2) the case originally was commenced as an
involuntary case under [chapter 11]; or (3) the case was converted to a case
under [chapter 11] other than on the debtor’s request.”129 Upon conversion to a
chapter 7 case, the court appoints a trustee to take control of liquidating the
remaining assets and distributing the proceeds among creditors.130 Because a
court-appointed trustee immediately takes control of the estate in a chapter 7
case, the debtor has a limited role in the remainder of the process.131 The debtor
in chapter 7 primarily wants to retain property that is exempt from liquidation
and receive a discharge for any remaining debts.132
3. Dismissal with No “Bells and Whistles”
When a bankruptcy court dismisses a case, the court and adversary
proceedings related to the case cease.133 Dismissals can occur voluntarily (at
the debtor’s request) or involuntarily (at the request of the creditors or sua
sponte).134 Section 1112(b) discusses the framework for chapter 11 dismissals.
125

9D AM. JUR. 2d BANKR. § 2978.
Id.
127 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). Confirmable nonconsensual plans must still satisfy all requirements under
§ 1129(a), except (a)(8). Id. Section 1129(a)(9) mandates that a reorganization plan must satisfy § 507 to be
confirmable. Id. § 1129(a)(9).
128 See In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174, 176 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The policy of equality
among creditors as articulated by IAM may be of significance in liquidation cases under Chapter 7, however,
the paramount policy and goal of Chapter 11, to which all other bankruptcy policies are subordinated, is the
rehabilitation of the debtor.”).
129 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a).
130 John B. Newman, Conversion of a Bankruptcy From Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, NEWMAN & SIMPSON,
LLP, http://www.newmansimpson.com/conversion-of-a-bankruptcy-from-chapter-11-to-chapter-7.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2016).
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 UNITED STATES BANKR. COURT CENT. DIST. OF CAL., supra note 73.
134 Id.
126
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The party requesting a chapter 11 dismissal must prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that sufficient cause to dismiss the case exists.135 Section
1112(b)(4) list sixteen permissible causes for dismissal;136 courts may,
however, consider other factors and dismiss a case at their discretion.137
Once cause is established and the court dismisses the case, the debtor is
returned to its prebankruptcy status.138 This type of dismissal has no bells and
whistles. In other words, there are no additional proceedings or tasks for the
debtor to follow or tasks for the debtor to complete related to its bankruptcy
case.139 Dismissal releases the debtor’s estate from the court’s control and
allows creditors to resume attempts to collect any owed debt from the debtor.140
D. Bankruptcy Priority Scheme
Section 1129(a)(9) requires that a reorganization plan must satisfy § 507 to
be confirmable.141 Section 507, the bankruptcy priority scheme, dictates the
order that claims are paid.142 The bankruptcy priority scheme is analogous to a
ladder where each rung represents a priority level.143 Section 507 lists the
mandatory asset distribution order based on class priorities.144 Bankruptcy
prioritizes repayment in full to claim holders based upon their position on the
ladder; claim holders positioned higher up on the ladder will be paid in full
before lower positioned claim holders.145
There are two major categories of claims: “secured” and “unsecured.”146
Secured claims give the claim holder the right to collect its debt from a specific

135

BLOOMBERG LAW: BANKRUPTCY TREATISE, supra note 107, pt. V, ch. 165.
11 U.S.C § 1112(b)(4) (2012).
137 In re Charles St. Afr. Methodist Episcopal Church of Bos., 499 B.R. 66, 112 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2013).
138 Bankruptcy Dismissal, THIS MATTER, http://thismatter.com/money/credit/bankruptcy/dismissal.htm
(last visited Aug. 25, 2016).
139 See id.
140 Id.; see also Monica S. Blacker, Michael P. Cooley & Vickie Driver, Structured Dismissals: The Least
Worst Option, DALLAS BAR ASSOCIATION: BANKRUPTCY & COMMERCIAL LAW SECTION (Nov. 5 2014),
http://images.jw.com/com/publications/2024.pdf.
141 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9).
142 See id. § 507.
143 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 507.02 (“The preferred categories of claims are
designated as having priority over other categories of claims and are entitled to payment in full before those
not granted priority.”).
144 11 U.S.C § 507.
145 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 507.02.
146 See id. ¶ 507.02[4][a].
136
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piece of property.147 If a debtor pledges a piece of its property as collateral
when he or she incurs the debt, the claim is voluntary.148 In contrast, claim
holders can create involuntary claims by obtaining a lien on a debtor’s property
through a court order.149
Unsecured claims are debts not protected by a security interest in the
debtor’s property.150 Examples of unsecured claims include medical bills,
credit card bills, and cash advance loans. If a debtor does not pay its unsecured
debts, the creditor does not have the authority to collect its debt from a specific
piece of the debtor’s property.
Secured claims are not included in the priority scheme ladder because the
nature of a secured claim allows the claim holder to recover its debt directly
from a specific piece of property.151 Unsecured claims, however, are positioned
in hierarchal order in accordance with the priority scheme.152 The remaining
unsecured claims are arranged in descending order of priority according to
§ 507.153
II. DISCUSSION
Part II begins with an analysis of the permissibility of structured dismissals
under the Code, followed by a discussion of when structured dismissals are
appropriate. This Comment concludes with an examination of the competing
circuit court views on whether structured dismissals are allowed.

147 See id. (“A lien is a charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance
of an obligation.”). Common types of secured claims are mortgages and car loans. For example, if a debtor
does not make the necessary payments on a car loan, the claim holder has the power to repossess the car and
sell it to repay the debt.
148 See id.
149 See id. ¶ 507.02[3][a][i].
150 Unsecured claims are representative of the claims assessed under § 507. See
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)
(2012); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 507.02[4][a] (“The priorities granted by section 507 are
priorities as against holders of unsecured claims only.”). In drafting the priority scheme, Congress decided that
domestic support obligations should hold the highest priority amongst unsecured claimants. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(1)(A)–(C).
151 James H. Barnhill, The Conundrum of an Inadequately Protected Secured Creditor, 97 COM. L.J. 367,
369 (1992).
152 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 507.01.
153 See id.
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A. The Code Allows Structured Dismissals
The Code does not explicitly provide bankruptcy courts with the power to
grant structured dismissals.154 As a result, structured dismissals are a byproduct of courts’ and parties’ creativity. Parties seeking a structured dismissal
invoke §§ 1112(b), 305(a)(1), 349(b), and 105(a) for statutory validation.155 A
plain reading of these sections provides ample support for structured dismissals
under the Code. Furthermore, the legislative intent of § 349 confirms
Congress’s desire to provide courts with the discretion to implement creative
judgments within the bounds of the Code.
The court’s statutory authority to grant a dismissal, structured or not, is
derived from § 1112(b).156 To obtain a dismissal under § 1112(b), the debtor
must demonstrate cause.157 If a debtor successfully demonstrates cause, the
court must dismiss the case, absent unusual circumstances identified by the
court.158 To justify cause for a structured dismissal, debtors can assert that there

154

In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2015).
Blaire Cahn, In re Jevic Holding Corp. Part I: Third Circuit Authorizes Structured Dismissals in
Limited Circumstances, WEIL BANKR. BLOG (June 30, 2015), https://business-finance-restructuring.
weil.com/rules-and-procedures/in-re-jevic-holding-corp-part-i-third-circuit-authorizes-structured-dismissalsin-limited-circumstances/.
156 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (2012). Specifically, the language of this section reads:
155

Except as provided in paragraph (2) and subsection (c), on request of a party in interest, and after
notice and a hearing, the court shall convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 or
dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and the estate, for
cause unless the court determines that the appointment under section 1104(a) of a trustee or an
examiner is in the best interests of creditors and the estate.
Id.
157

See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 1112.04[6].
In re Hinesley Family Ltd. P’ship, No. 1, 460 B.R. 547, 551 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2011). Specifically, the
court noted:
158

Although section 1112(b) does not define the phrase “unusual circumstances,” it clearly
contemplates conditions that are not common in most chapter 11 cases. Although each chapter 11
case is to some extent unique, and unusual circumstances may exist in any particular case
regardless of its size or complexity, the import of section 1112(b) is that, if cause exists, the case
should be converted or dismissed unless unusual facts or circumstances demonstrate that the
purposes of chapter 11 would be better served by maintaining the case as a chapter 11
proceeding.
Id.; accord Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 442,
119 Stat. 23. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 amended § 1112(b) to
clarify that courts must grant a dismissal where cause is adequately demonstrated. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)
(2012) (emphasis added). Obtaining a dismissal is a bifurcated process. See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
supra note 89, ¶ 1112.04[7]. Step one requires debtors to demonstrate cause, and step two allows courts to
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is a “substantial or continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and the
absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation” or an “inability to
effectuate substantial consummation of a plan.”159 For example, the debtors and
creditors in In re Jevic agreed that a structured dismissal was a more
appropriate strategy than continuing bankruptcy proceedings.160 A dismissal
was more desirable to the parties because continuing bankruptcy proceedings
would only drain the value of the debtor’s limited remaining assets.161 A
dismissal is typically an appropriate strategy for debtors that have either
liquidated a majority of their assets, do not have the necessary assets to
proceed with a confirmation plan, or both.162
As discussed in Part I supra, structured dismissals can occur after a § 363
asset sale.163 Under § 1112(b), courts typically grant a dismissal, structured or
otherwise, after a § 363 sale because the debtor has liquidated most of its assets
and cannot consummate a reorganization plan.164
Section 305(a)(1), while traditionally applied in involuntary bankruptcy
cases, serves as another source of justification for structured dismissals.165
Involuntary bankruptcy cases often arise when creditors involved in out-ofcourt restructuring negotiations force a debtor into bankruptcy to obtain more
desirable treatment.166 Section 305(a)(1) grants the court the authority to
dismiss a case at any time if “the interests of creditors and the debtor would be
better served by such dismissal or suspension.”167 Courts generally perceive
§ 305(a)(1) dismissals as an extraordinary remedy because they are final
judgments not eligible for appellate review.168

consider if granting the dismissal is in the best interest of creditors and the estate. Rollex Corp. v. Associated
Materials, Inc. (In re Superior Siding & Window, Inc.), 14 F.3d 240, 242 (4th Cir. 1994).
159 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b); accord Camden Ordnance Mfg. Co. of Ark. v. U.S. Trustee (In re Camden
Ordnance Mfg. Co. of Ark.), 245 B.R. 794, 799–800 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that a dismissal is appropriate
where the debtor’s assets have been liquidated and there are no assets to reorganize); Ollerman & Douglas,
supra note 4; Kane, supra note 58.
160 787 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2015).
161 Id. at 176–77.
162 Pernick & Dean, supra note 2, at 57.
163 See Part I.B supra.
164 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(M).
165 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 89, ¶ 305.02.
166 11 U.S.C. §§ 303, 305(a)(1) (2012); Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4.
167 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(1).
168 Id. § 305(c):
An order under subsection (a) of this section dismissing a case or suspending all proceedings in a
case, or a decision not so to dismiss or suspend, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the
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In conjunction with §§ 1112(b) and 305(a)(1), proponents of structured
dismissals rely on § 105(a) to extend the court’s dismissal authority. Section
105(a) permits bankruptcy courts to “issue any order, process, or judgment that
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the Code.169 “Thus,
§ 105(a) appears to grant bankruptcy courts authority to approve structured
dismissals, because §§ 305 and 1112 of the Code provide means for dismissing
cases.”170 Sections 105(a) does not, however, give the court the authority to
issue orders inconsistent with the Code.171 The Supreme Court in Law v. Siegel
held that “a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory provisions
[of the Code].”172 Section 105(a), therefore, allows courts to issue structured
dismissal orders pursuant to §§ 1112(b) or 305(a)(1).
In re 155 Route 10 Associates illustrates the court’s willingness to approve
structured dismissals so long as they do not conflict with the Code. In In re 155
Route 10, the debtors sought a structured dismissal, citing § 105(a).173 The
trustee objected, and argued that because structured dismissals are not
expressly permitted by the Code, they are prohibited.174 The court disagreed,
and granted the debtor’s structured dismissal pursuant to § 105(a).175
While §§ 1112(b), 305(a)(1), and 105(a) govern courts’ authority to issue
dismissal orders, § 349 discusses the effect of a dismissal. Section 349(b) gives
courts discretion to deviate from a standard dismissal “for cause”;176 however,
the ways in which courts have interpreted “for cause” varies, as illustrated by
the two decisions in In re Sadler and In re Naartjie Custom Kids, Inc.177
The Seventh Circuit in In re Sadler defined “cause” as “an acceptable
reason,” based on the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.178 The
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah in In re Naartjie Custom Kids, Inc.,

court of appeals under section 158(d), 1291, or 1292 of title 28 or by the Supreme Court of the
United States under section 1254 of title 28.
169

Id. § 105(a); accord Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194 (2014).
Kane, supra note 58.
171 Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. at 1194; In re Fesco Plastics Corp., 996 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding § 105 allows courts to “enforce the provisions of the Code, not to add on to the Code as they see fit”).
172 134 S. Ct. at 1194.
173 2012 WL 3570157.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 11 U.S.C. § 349 (2012); In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2015); In re Naartjie
Custom Kids, Inc., 534 B.R. 416, 422 (Bankr. D. Utah 2015).
177 See, e.g., In re Sadler, 935 F.2d 918, 921 (7th Cir. 1991); In re Naartjie, 534 B.R. at 422.
178 935 F.2d at 921.
170
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however, began its analysis of § 349 by looking to the plain language of the
statute.179 The court held that § 349(b) is unambiguous because it clearly reads,
“unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, a dismissal of the case . . .”180
Under this interpretation of the statute, a bankruptcy court is not bound to
ordering a dismissal that solely discharges the parties and closes the case.181
The legislative intent of § 349 is also parallel with the literal writing of the
statute.182 The House Report enumerates the effects of dismissal and states,
“the court is permitted to order a different result for cause.”183
B. Under What Circumstances Is a Structured Dismissal Appropriate?
The Third Circuit in In re Jevic refrained from deciding the question of
whether structured dismissals are allowed if a confirmable chapter 11 plan or
chapter 7 conversion is possible.184 The court did not need to answer the
question because there was no prospect of the debtors proposing a confirmable
chapter 11 plan with the limited remaining assets in the estate.185 Opponents of
structured dismissals argue that debtors will use this type of dismissal to
circumvent plan confirmation or conversion processes.186 To prevent this
practice, the court serves as a safeguard against a debtor’s ability to abuse
structured dismissals.187 Though dictum, the Third Circuit noted that “absent a
179

534 B.R. at 422; Kane, supra note 58.
Id. at 422.
181 See id.; see also In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 2015).
182 In re Naartjie, 534 B.R. at 422.
183 Id. at 423 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 338 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6294).
184 787 F.3d at 182.
185 Id. at 181–82.
186 See Lambert, Eitel & Tinker, supra note 18, at 20.
187 See In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 269 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014) (“Courts serve as a safeguard against
abuse by rejecting plans and dismissals that circumvent the protections allotted in the Bankruptcy Code.”). In
re Biolitec serves as a more recent example of courts serving as a safeguard. 528 B.R. 261. The court in In re
Biolitec rejected a motion for an entry of an order dismissing the debtor’s chapter 11 case pursuant to 11
U.S.C. §§ 105(a), 305(a), 349, and 1112(b) and a settlement agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 9019. Id. at 272. The debtor’s settlement and structured dismissal proposed that the
Debtor’s chapter 11 case would be dismissed pursuant to § 1112(b); however, the Court would retain
jurisdiction over the two adversary proceedings that were pending in the case, the claims reconciliation and
objection process, and all matters related to the Liquidating Trust. Id. The settlement further stated:
180

(1)

With the exception of any potential interest of the estate in the Massachusetts Action, the
Trustee will contribute all remaining estate assets to the Liquidating Trust. The estate will
relinquish and assign any interest it has in the Massachusetts Action (or in any new action
commenced by AngioDynamics against the Non-Debtor Affiliates to collect on its
Judgment Claim) to AngioDynamics, although AngioDynamics will contribute a portion of
any recovery obtained in these actions (up to $2,000,000) to the Liquidating Trust.
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showing that a structured dismissal has been contrived to evade the procedural
protections and safeguards of the plan confirmation or conversion processes, a
bankruptcy court has discretion to order such a disposition.”188 Courts normally
reject any resemblance of a plan, settlement, or dismissal order that aims to
circumvent the standard chapter 11 proceedings because of the judicially–
created concept of sub rosa plans.189
In a sub rosa plan, “a chapter 11 debtor constructs a broad settlement that
amounts to a de facto plan of reorganization, which enables a debtor to
restructure its debt while bypassing many of the Bankruptcy Code’s
fundamental creditor protections.”190 Section 1129 provides four significant
and fundamental protections: (1) the right of impaired creditors to vote on a
proposed plan;191 (2) the requirement of good faith;192 (3) best interest of

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)
(6)

AngioDynamics will fund the formation of the Liquidating Trust and make additional
contributions for the payment of allowed administrative expense claims. AngioDynamics
will also contribute any interest it might have in the real property that is the subject of the
CeramOptec Proceeding to the Liquidating Trust.
Development Specialists, Inc. (“DSI”) will be appointed as the liquidating trustee
(“Liquidating Trustee”). AngioDynamics will serve as trust advisor to DSI and “provide
direction or consent to all significant actions of the Liquidating Trust.”
The Liquidating Trustee will be substituted for the Trustee in the two pending adversary
proceedings and any other action commenced by the Trustee. The Liquidating Trustee will
also be substituted for the Trustee to oversee the claims reconciliation and objection
process. AngioDynamics will be joined as a party to these actions and pursue them for the
benefit of the Liquidating Trust.
All claims of the Non-Debtor Affiliates will be subordinated to all allowed claims.
The Trustee will be released from any liability in connection with the chapter 11 case.

Id. at 265–66 (numerals added). The court declined to grant the order because the debtor did not demonstrate
that the proposed settlement and dismissal were in the best interests of the estate and its creditors. Id. at 270.
“[I]n the absence of the consent of all parties, the Court is precluded from approving a settlement that alters
parties’ rights but ignores many of the Code’s most important creditor protections.” Id. at 272.
188 In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 182.
189 In re Biolitec, 528 B.R. at 261 (denying the chapter 11 trustee’s motion for a structured dismissal
because it sought to “alter parties’ rights without their consent and lacks many of the Code’s most important
safeguards”).
190 Del. Tr. Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holdings, LLC (In re Energy Future Holding Corp.), 527
B.R. 157, 168 (Bankr. D. Del. 2015).
191 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8), (10) (2012).
192 Id. § 1129(a)(3).
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creditors;193 and (4) the feasibility test.194 These protections ensure that
creditors are on notice by the proposed plan.195
In re Braniff Airways Inc. was the first case to conceptualize a sub rosa
plan.196 The debtor, Braniff Airways, Inc., filed for bankruptcy under chapter
11 in May 1982.197 In turn, the FAA promulgated a special regulation to
mitigate the effect of Braniff Airways’s termination and bankruptcy.198 The
FAA allocated Braniff Airways’s four hundred landing slots amongst various
other airline carriers.199 The Unsecured Creditors’ Committee then questioned
whether the FAA’s allocation of the slots interfered with Braniff Airways’s
property.200 The bankruptcy court and FAA responded by stipulating that the
slots would be returned “should Braniff or an air carrier succeeding to the
rights, duties and obligations of Braniff begin operations.”201
In December 1982, Braniff Airways proposed a settlement agreement to the
bankruptcy court.202 Under the settlement agreement, the debtor would transfer
cash, landing slots, and equipment to Pacific Southwest Airlines in exchange
for profit participation in future Pacific Southwest Airlines operations.203 The
settlement also specified that future profits would be issued to only Braniff
Airways’s employees, shareholders, or a limited amount of unsecured
creditors.204 In a separate stipulation agreement designated for Braniff
Airways’s creditors, the debtor developed provisions that required secured
creditors “to vote a portion of their deficiency claim in favor of any future
reorganization plan approved by a majority of the unsecured creditors’
committee.”205After a month of oral arguments from interested parties, the
193

Id. § 1129(a)(7).
See id. § 1129(a)(11); Craig A Sloane, The Sub Rosa Plan of Reorganization: Side-Stepping Creditors
Protections in Chapter 11, 16 BANKR. DEV. J. 37, 41–42 (1999). The Emory Bankruptcy Developments
Journal published without the name of the sponsoring school until 2004.
195 Sloane, supra note 194, at 40.
196 700 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Kimon Korres, Note, Bankrupting Bankruptcy: Circumventing
Chapter 11 Protections Through Manipulation of the Business Justification Standard in § 363 Asset Sales, and
a Refined Standard to Safeguard Against Abuse, 63 FLA. L. REV. 959, 964 n.50 (2013).
197 In re Braniff Airways, 700 F.2d at 938.
198 Id.
199 Id. Landing slots are specific timeframes given to airlines for departing and arriving aircrafts. Id. at
940.
200 Id. at 938.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 939.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 940.
194
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bankruptcy court entered its order approving the Braniff Airways and Pacific
Southwest Airlines settlement agreement.206
On review, the court held that the settlement agreement was null because it
dictated future provisions of a reorganization plan.207 For example, if devised
according to the settlement agreement, any future reorganization plan would
have to allocate the profits to a limited group of creditors.208 According to the
court, Braniff was not allowed to “short circuit” the chapter 11 confirmation
process for a reorganization plan by predetermining profit allocations.209
Additionally, the stipulation agreement disenfranchised creditors during the
reorganization plan process.210
In re Braniff Airways serves as a pillar for the notion that courts should not
confirm any plan, settlement, or dismissal order that effectively encroaches on
the protections and proceedings in the Code. In bankruptcy proceedings, a
structured dismissal is only appropriate when the debtor can adequately show
that confirming a plan or converting a chapter 11 case would be overly
burdensome.211 Otherwise, the structured dismissal will highly resemble a sub
rosa plan, thus constituting a tactic to circumvent the explicit exit strategies.212
Ultimately, chapter 11 confirmation plans are preferred in comparison to
structured dismissals because they give debtors the opportunity to reorganize
their business while simultaneously repaying creditors.213 Chapter 11 to chapter
7 conversions, when in the best interest of creditors and the estate,214 are also
advantageous because the remaining estate assets are liquidated and distributed
according to the Code’s priority scheme.215 As the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of New Jersey noted, “[i]f a chapter 11 case could be dismissed solely
to avoid additional expenses associated with liquidating the estate, parties

206

Id. at 938.
Id. at 940.
208 Id. at 939.
209 Id. at 940.
210 Id.
211 Brent Weisenberg, Expediting Chapter 11 Liquidating Debtor’s Distribution to Creditors, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2012, at 36, 106.
212 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2012) (listing the requirements to confirm a plan); id. § 1112 (a)–(b) (listing the
requirements to either convert a chapter 11 case to chapter 7 case or dismiss a case).
213 FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 109, http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?openagent&nav=
menu1&page=/federal/courts.nsf/page/201.
214 Ollerman & Douglas, supra note 4.
215 Lambert, Eitel & Tinker, supra note 18, at 20.
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would rarely, if ever, convert to chapter 7 and the conversion option in section
1112(b) would essentially be rendered superfluous.”216
In consideration of the Third Circuit’s dictum in In re Jevic and the § 1129
requirements for plan confirmation, a structured dismissal, specifically one in
the form of a settlement agreement, is not appropriate where a confirmable
chapter 11 plan or chapter 7 conversion is possible.
C. The Code’s Priority Scheme Applies to Structured Dismissal Settlements
Caselaw divides settlements into two categories.217 The first type of
settlement is one that is proposed as a part of a chapter 11 reorganization
plan.218 Courts have limited discretion in approving these types of settlements
because of the fair and equitable standard.219 Thus, any settlement proposed as
a part of a reorganization plan must arrange the distribution of claim payments
in accordance with the bankruptcy priority scheme.220
The second type of settlement is an agreement parties reach outside of a
reorganization plan.221 These types of settlements have received different
methods of treatment from the circuit courts.222 The circuits are split on
whether a court must apply the fair and equitable standard when considering a
proposed nonconsensual settlement that parties formed outside of a
reorganization plan.223
The following sections will review the Fifth, Second, and Third Circuit
approaches to the fair and equitable standard. This Comment will then argue
that the Fifth Circuit’s rule is favorable, and that the fair and equitable standard
should also apply to settlements outside of the reorganization plan; therefore,
deviation from the Code’s priority scheme would be impermissible.

216

In re Biolitec, Inc., 528 B.R. 261, 269 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014).
Compare Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414,
424 (1968), with In re AWECO, Inc., 725 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1984).
218 See In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298.
219 Id.; In re Jackson Brewing Co., 624 F.2d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 1980).
220 In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298; see 11 U.S.C. 1129(a)(9) (2012).
221 See In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298.
222 Compare id., and In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 466–67 (2d Cir. 2007), with In re Jevic
Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 186 (3d Cir. 2015).
223 Compare In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298, and In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 466–67, with In re Jevic, 787
F.3d at 186.
217
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1. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit in In re AWECO, Inc. was the first circuit to decide the
applicability of the Code’s priority scheme to settlements outside of a
reorganization plan.224 When AWECO, Inc., filed for bankruptcy in early 1981,
it had four major creditors.225 Of these creditors, United American Car Co. held
an unsecured claim for approximately $27 million that was the result of a
breach of contract lawsuit.226 Litigation between AWECO and United
American lasted for almost two years while AWECO’s chapter 11 bankruptcy
proceeding was pending.227 Ultimately, AWECO and United American agreed
to settle the lawsuit.228 The terms of the settlement provided that AWECO
would transfer $5.3 million in cash and property to United American.229 The
settlement did not include any repayment of AWECO’s outstanding debts to its
other three creditors.230 Notably, one of the three excluded creditors held a
secured claim in the property that AWECO agreed to transfer to United
American under the settlement agreement.231
After AWECO notified the bankruptcy court of its intention to settle, its
creditors objected.232 The creditors argued that the settlement between
AWECO and United American was unfair.233 The court approved the
settlement over the creditors’ objection, and the creditors appealed.234
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the bankruptcy court must
“apply the fair and equitable standard in considering a priority creditor’s
objections to a settlement.”235 The court declined to adopt United American’s
argument that the fair and equitable standard does not extend to any outside
224 725 F.2d at 298; Peter Doggett Jr., What Exactly Does the Term “Fair and Equitable” Mean?, 1 ST.
JOHN’S BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. 1 (2009), http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/journals/abi/sjbrl/
volume/v1/doggett.stj.
225 In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 295. In addition to United American’s claim, the Department of Energy had
a $45 million claim; the IRS had two priority claims totaling over $7 million; and Sutton Investments, Inc., had
a claim for approximately $8 million. Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 296.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 Id. at 295.
233 Id. at 296.
234 Id. at 297.
235 Id. at 298. This issue is narrower than simply deciding whether the fair and equitable standard applies
to any outside settlement. See id.; see also Doggett Jr., supra note 224.
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settlements.236 Instead, the court analyzed the policy implications of the fair
and equitable standard:
As soon as a debtor files a petition for relief, fair and equitable
settlement of creditors’ claims becomes a goal of the proceedings.
The goal does not suddenly appear during the process of approving a
plan of compromise. Moreover, if the standard had no application
before confirmation of a reorganization plan, then bankruptcy courts
would have the discretion to favor junior classes of creditors so long
as the approval of the settlement came before the plan237

The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the fair and equitable standard must apply
because it prevents bankruptcy courts from favoring one group of creditors
solely because a settlement is created outside the reorganization plan.238 The
court explained that the decision to apply the fair and equitable standard was
not to “radically restrict” bankruptcy courts from approving settlements, but
rather to ensure that “settlements do not impose an unfair detriment on
creditors.”239
2. Second Circuit
Over twenty years after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re AWECO, the
Second Circuit adopted its own application of the priority rules to outside
settlement agreements in In re Iridium Operating LLC.240 Iridium Operating
LLC operated as a subsidiary of Motorola, Inc., until 1998 when it became an
independent company.241 Iridium’s independence was short-lived; it filed for
chapter 11 in 1999.242 Months before filing bankruptcy, Iridium borrowed
$1.55 billion from JPMorgan Chase Bank.243
JPMorgan asserted claims over the remaining Iridium assets, and the
Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors objected to the claims.244 The
Committee also sought recourse against Motorola, alleging breach of contract,
236

In re AWECO, 725 F.2d at 298.
Id.
238 Id. (determining that if the standard had no application before confirmation of a reorganization plan,
then bankruptcy courts would have the discretion to favor junior classes of creditors so long as the approval of
the settlement came before the plan was proposed).
239 Id. at 299.
240 478 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2007); Doggett Jr., supra note 224.
241 In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 456.
242 Id. at 457.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 456.
237
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breach of fiduciary duty, and avoidance of fraudulent conveyances.245 Because
the Committee did not have sufficient funds to both contest the claims and
pursue legal action against JPMorgan and Motorola, however, the Committee
and JPMorgan reached a settlement agreement.246 In the agreement, the
Committee and JPMorgan proposed to divide Iridium’s remaining assets
amongst themselves.247 Against Motorola’s objection that the settlement would
distribute estate property to lower priority creditors before more senior ones,
the bankruptcy court approved the settlement.248 The decision was affirmed by
the district court, and Motorola appealed.249
Motorola contended that the bankruptcy court improperly approved the
settlement because it did not meet the fair and equitable standard—junior
creditors were paid before senior creditors.250 Motorola claimed “a settlement
can never be fair and equitable if junior creditors’ claims are satisfied before
those of more senior claims.”251
The court agreed that the fair and equitable standard is a requirement for
settlements proposed within a reorganization plan, relying on the Supreme
Court’s decision in TMT Trailer Ferry v. Anderson.252 There, the Supreme
Court held that “the requirements . . . that plans of reorganization be both ‘fair
and equitable[]’ apply to compromises just as to other aspects of
reorganizations.”253 The Supreme Court further distinguished that the
established requirement applied explicitly to settlements that are a part of a
reorganization plan.254
Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning, the Second Circuit concluded
that the settlement between JPMorgan and the Committee was not bound by
the fair and equitable standard because it was not proposed as a part of
Iridium’s chapter 11 reorganization plan.255 The Second Circuit noted:
“[W]hether a particular settlement’s distribution scheme complies with the
Code’s priority scheme must be the most important factor for the bankruptcy
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255

Id. at 458.
Id. at 458–59.
Id. at 459.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 462.
Id.
Id. at 461 (citing 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968)).
TMT Trailer Ferry, 390 U.S. at 424.
Id.; see also In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 461.
In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 463.
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court to consider when determining whether a settlement [within a
reorganization plan] is ‘fair and equitable . . . .’”256 The court also noted that if
a court approves a settlement that deviates from the priority scheme, it must
articulate its reasoning in the opinion.257
The Second Circuit in In re Iridium applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in TMT Trailer Ferry too narrowly.258 Although TMT Trailer Ferry involved
discussed a settlement agreement that was connected to a reorganization plan,
the Court’s ruling covers settlements devised during a bankruptcy
proceeding.259 The Supreme Court held that “requirements . . . that plans of
reorganization be both ‘fair and equitable[]’ apply to compromises just as to
other aspects of reorganizations.”260 Other aspects of the reorganizations should
encompass structured dismissals.
3. Third Circuit
In In re Jevic, the Third Circuit elected to adopt the more flexible rule from
In re Iridium.261 The court highlighted that deviations from the § 507 priority
scheme are only permissible if the court can articulate “specific and credible
grounds to justify the deviation.”262
This flexible rule presents several issues, however. Primarily, the doors of
discretion are left open for courts to create varying interpretations of “specific
and credible grounds.” Both the Second and Third Circuits were wary of
establishing a less rigid adaptation of the Fifth Circuit’s rule in In re AWECO,
and for good reason.263 In his dissenting opinion in In re Jevic, Judge Scirica
departed from the majority opinion on the grounds that the facts from this case
did not present a credible justification to deviate from the priority scheme.264

256

Id. at 465.
Id.
258 See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Illinois, et al. at 9, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 136 S. Ct.
2541 (2016) (No. 15-649), 2015 WL 9315587, at *9.
259 390 U.S. 414, 424 (1968); Brief of Amici Curiae States of Illinois, et al., supra note 258, at 9.
260 TMT Trailer Ferry, 390 U.S. at 424.
261 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 184 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We agree with the Second Circuit’s
approach in Iridium . . . .”).
262 Id.
263 Id. (“We admit that it is a close call . . . .”); In re Iridium, 478 F.3d at 464 (“Rejection of a per se rule
has an unfortunate side effect, however: a heightened risk that the parties to a settlement may engage in
improper collusion.”).
264 In re Jevic, 787 F.3d at 186 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
257
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Judge Scirica went on to suggest a way that the court could have effectively
unwound the case in accordance with the priority scheme:
I recognize that if the settlement were unwound, this case would
likely be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation in which the secured
creditors would be the only creditors to recover. Accordingly, I
would not unwind the settlement entirely. Instead, I would permit the
secured creditors to retain the releases for which they bargained and
would not disturb any of the proceeds received by the administrative
creditors either. But I would also require the bankruptcy court to
determine the WARN Plaintiffs’ damages under the New Jersey
WARN Act, as well as the proportion of those damages that qualifies
for the wage priority. I would then have the court order any proceeds
that were distributed to creditors with a priority lower than that of the
WARN Plaintiffs disgorged, and apply those proceeds to the WARN
Plaintiffs’ wage priority claim. To the extent that funds are left over, I
would have the court redistribute them to the remaining creditors in
accordance with the Code’s priority scheme.265

Judge Scirica’s ability to construct a viable exit strategy, despite the majority’s
contention that there was no conceivable alternative to deviating from the
priority scheme, reveals the dangers of an arbitrary “specific and credible
grounds” standard.266 With the standard from In re Iridium permitting the
court’s discretion, creditors and debtors cannot evaluate whether their case
amounts to the level of credibility needed to deviate from the priority scheme.
Beyond the grave confusion and arbitrariness created by the Second and
Third Circuit’s flexible standard, the Code simply does not permit selective
deviations from the priority scheme in bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, the
priority scheme applies to reorganization plans as well as settlements.267
“Section 507 priorities reflect important and long-standing congressional
judgments about what is fair and equitable in relation to the distribution of
bankruptcy estate property.”268 When the Code was written, Congress did not
intend, in any way, for the priorities to apply exclusively to select aspects of a
bankruptcy proceeding.269 The purpose of priorities is to ensure that the

265

Id. at 189.
Id. at 186.
267 Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League at 10,
Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 136 S. Ct. 2541 (2016) (No.15-649), 2015 WL 9252251, at *10.
268 Id.
269 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 1–2, In re Jevic Holding Corp.,
787 F.3d 173 (No. 14-1465), 2014 WL 4184509, at *1–2:
266
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creditors Congress deemed most vulnerable and important receive their portion
of the estate before unsecured creditors.270 Accordingly, § 103 of the Code
extends the priority scheme to chapters 5, 7, 11, 12, and 13.271
Since Congress designed the priority scheme to apply to all bankruptcy
chapters, it follows that Congress intended the priority scheme to apply to all
estate distributions within a bankruptcy proceeding. The court in In re AWECO
noted: “[A]s soon as a debtor files a petition for relief, fair and equitable
settlement of creditors’ claims becomes a goal of the proceedings.”272 In other
words, the fair and equitable standard does not suddenly appear during plan
proposals; instead, distributing the assets in accordance with the priority
scheme is a goal that permeates the entire bankruptcy proceeding.273
Neither the Code nor legislative history supports applying § 507
exclusively to reorganization plans.274 The Third Circuit’s willingness to permit
class-skipping also creates a dangerous practice of manipulation and evasion of
the Code. The ex-employees in In re Jevic held a perfected WARN Act claim,
which under § 507(a)(4) entitled them to payment before other unsecured
creditors.275 Almost seven years later, the ex-employees have yet to receive the
unpaid wages and benefits they are entitled to under federal labor laws.276 The
practice of select creditors constructing a settlement agreement amongst

The bankruptcy court’s decision sanctions a mechanism that permits parties to distribute estate
assets (here proceeds from the compromise of estate causes of action) in violation of the priorities
established by the Bankruptcy Code for the payment of creditor claims. That decision
undermines a fundamental principle of bankruptcy that the debtor’s assets will be distributed
fairly and threatens to destroy confidence in the bankruptcy system. Moreover, there appears to
be no reason why the . . . rationale could not be extended to permit parties to violate other Code
requirements in the context of a settlement, so long as the bankruptcy court found that the
settlement benefitted some of the creditors.
270

Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note
267, at 10 (“The Third Circuit’s decision undermines fundamental bankruptcy principles and invites
manipulation of the bankruptcy process to eviscerate the priority rights Congress expressly conferred on those
most in need of protection in the bankruptcy process.”).
271 11 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National
Consumers League, supra note 267, at 10.
272 725 F.2d 293, 298 (5th Cir. 1984); Brief of Amici Curiae States of Illinois, et al., supra note 258, at 9.
273 See Brief of Amici Curiae States of Illinois, et al., supra note 258, at 11.
274 See id.
275 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2015); see 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4)(A); see also
Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note 267, at
10.
276 Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note
267, at 7.
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themselves that intentionally excludes other priority creditors amounts to an
unlawful evasion of the Code.277 If courts permit this type of behavior,
creditors can essentially bypass the priority scheme whenever the Code does
not afford them a favorable outcome.278
The Third Circuit described its decision to grant a settlement that deviated
from the Code’s priorities as “the least bad alternative.”279 In summation, the
Third Circuit reasoned that the bankruptcy court should have adopted the
corporate respondents’ settlement proposal over the employees’ objections
because the corporate respondents would be better off and the ex-employees
would be no worse off.280 A bankruptcy court, however, does not have the
discretion to grant this type of order.281 “Claims of necessity or hardship cannot
justify approving a distribution of estate assets outside a plan in a manner that
violates the priority scheme.”282
In adopting the flexible standard from In re Iridium, the Second and Third
Circuits determined that bankruptcy courts can choose when and how to apply
the Code’s priority rules. Their understanding is incorrect. In a recently
published student Note, Up the Chute, Down the Ladder: Shifting Priorities
Through Structured Dismissals in Bankruptcy, the author proposed a multifaceted analysis for courts to use when assessing whether to approve a
noncompliant structured dismissal.283 Some of the considerations included:
“[W]hether and when stakeholders whose rights would be affected by the
structured dismissal were informed of the negotiations leading up to the

277 Id. at 7 (“This represents an additional opportunity for wage theft—employers failing to pay
employees what they have earned.”); Reply Brief for Petitioners at 6, Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 136
S. Ct. 2541 (2016) (No. 15-649), 2016 WL 424790, at *6 (“Allowing debtors and select creditors to collude on
a private deal to dispose of estate property outside this framework, in violation of the priority scheme,
undermines those provisions and is incompatible with the Code’s structure.”).
278 Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 277, at 2; Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law
Project & National Consumers League, supra note 267, at 6 (“Moreover, the Third Circuit’s liberal approach
to approving settlements in structured dismissals, creating an opportunity for the settling corporate parties to
bypass priority creditors, is likely to encourage more, and more problematic, motions for approval of
structured dismissals.”).
279 In re Jevic Holding Corp., 787 F.3d 173, 185 (3d Cir. 2015).
280 Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note
267, at 14.
281 See United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 229 (1996); United
States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 543 (1996); Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project &
National Consumers League, supra note 276, at 9.
282 Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 277, at 8.
283 Bethany Kate Smith, Note, Up the Chute, Down the Ladder: Shifting Priorities Through Structured
Dismissals in Bankruptcy, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2989, 3012 (2016).
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proposed agreement; [and] whether such stakeholders received sufficient
opportunity to participate in the negotiations.”284
The author’s suggested considerations are strikingly similar to the flexible
standard from In re Iridium. Both the court in In re Iridium and the author
prioritized the absolute priority rule in deciding whether to approve a
structured dismissal or settlement that deviates from § 507. What these
interpretations fail to recognize is that the application of § 507 is not flexible or
at the discretion of the court. Congress has already provided specific
mechanisms for distributing proceeds of an estate outside of the priority
scheme.285 Other than the exceptions provided for in §§ 364(c), 510, 724(b),
726(a)–(b), and 901, the only permissible deviation from § 507 is with the
consent of all creditors.286 Under § 1129, creditors are explicitly given the
authority to waive their priority rights.287 The In re Iridium standard and
proposed considerations in Up the Chute, Down the Ladder are therefore
unnecessary. As the court in In re Roth American, Inc. noted, where “Congress
intended to alter the priority scheme established in section 507, it has done so
explicitly.”288 The Third Circuit’s decision to approve the structured dismissal
in In re Jevic was therefore in error. None of the § 507 exceptions were present
in the case, and the settlement was not consensual amongst all the creditors,
namely the ex-employees.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision falls on the correct side of the argument.
Section 1129(b) is applicable when the parties do not agree on a proposed
reorganization plan, but all the other requirements, enumerated in § 1129(a),

284 Id. (“A bankruptcy court, in deciding whether a structured dismissal that violates section 507 is ‘fair
and equitable’ under Rule 9019, should pay particular attention to: whether and when stakeholders whose
rights would be affected by the structured dismissal were informed of the negotiations leading up to the
proposed agreement; whether such stakeholders received sufficient opportunity to participate in the
negotiations; whether such stakeholders received adequate opportunity to be heard on their objections; the
nature of the claims or interests that would be subordinated by the proposed agreement; the nature of the
claims or interests that would be protected or advanced through such subordination; whether there exists a
viable alternative to the proposed agreement; and the relative difference in payout that would result to each
class of creditors through the alternative course of conduct.”).
285 Brief of Amici Curiae National Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note
267, at 9 (“Where Congress found cause for an exception, Congress specified it expressly.”).
286 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c); 510; 724(b); 726(a)–(b); 901 (2012); Brief of Amici Curiae National
Employment Law Project & National Consumers League, supra note 267, at 15; see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)
(“[e]xcept to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed to a different treatment of such claim . .
. .”).
287 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9).
288 975 F.2d 949, 956 (3d Cir. 1992).
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are met.289 The court can confirm a nonconsensual plan so long as the plan is
“fair and equitable.”290 The fair and equitable requirement is critical because it
protects nonconsenting parties. For example, without the protections of
§ 1129(b) nonconsenting parties would be strongly coerced into plans that pay
lower priority creditors before paying more senior creditors in full. The fair
and equitable requirement must apply to all aspects of a bankruptcy case,
including structured dismissals, because without it, the § 507 priority scheme
would not be implicated.291
As previously discussed, § 507 enumerates the mandatory order in which
assets in a bankruptcy estate are distributed.292 A court’s discretionary authority
to deviate from the priority scheme is directly in conflict with Congress’s
promulgation of § 507. Nowhere in § 507 does the Code provide that the
priority scheme applies exclusively to one particular type of asset distribution
in a bankruptcy case. To afford claimants the same § 507 protections that they
have in reorganization plans, the absolute priority rule’s fair and equitable
requirement must therefore apply to settlements in the context of structured
dismissals.
CONCLUSION
Through statutory support, this Comment has shown that structured
dismissals are permissible so long as they do not deviate from the Code’s
priority rules. Under the Code, judges may grant structured dismissals where
both confirming a chapter 11 plan and converting to chapter 7 are implausible.
Structured dismissals are permissible so long as they abide by the provisions
within the Code. Specifically, a settlement devised in the context of a
structured dismissal must conform to § 507 of the Code, unless the exceptions
provided in §§ 364(c), 510, 724(b), 726(a)–(b), 901, and 1129(b) are met. On
review, the United States Supreme Court should affirm the permissibility of
structured dismissals, but reject the notion that structured dismissals may
deviate from the priority scheme.
KAYLYNN WEBB
289

11 U.S.C § 1129(b).
Id.
291 Id. § 1129(b)(1).
292 Id. § 507.
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School of Law (2017); B.A., summa cum laude, Howard University (2014). First, I would like to thank
290

WEBB GALLEYSPROOFS2

2016]

7/12/2017 2:57 PM

UTILIZING THE FOURTH OPTION

389

Professor Allison Thornton for her guidance and assistance in developing this Comment. Second, I would like
to thank Armstead Lewis, the 2015-2016 Editor-in-Chief of the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal, for
inspiring me to join the Journal. I also would like to thank the Staff of the Emory Bankruptcy Developments
Journal for their valuable contributions in editing this Comment. I especially would like to thank and honor
my mother Kathy Webb for serving as a continuous source of encouragement and wisdom. Finally, I would
like to acknowledge my parents, grandmother, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins, friends, mentors, and the Emory
Black Law Students Association for their continuous love and support throughout all my endeavors. This
Comment is in honor of my great-grandmother Grace Shaw, who always prayed for my success.

